arXiv:1605.07524 Date: submitted by
2017-03-24 Author(s): Maria Apostolaki
, Aviv Zohar
, Laurent Vanbever
As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.
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November 7, 2013 by Ed Felten. As a reward, the winning miner gets to add to the new block a special transaction that pays 25 new Bitcoins (worth about $6500 at current exchange rates) to himself. These mining rewards create an incentive for people to spend resources on mining. Ed and all proponents of Bitcoin; I would have to say Bitcoin prices for 2017 chart a curve shaped like an upturned hock ey sti ck, and boost ed the investment made b y network participants in mining hardware. First-generation miners used Grover’s algorithm confers on quantum computers a quadratic advantage over classical computers for searching in an arbitrary data set, a scenario that describes Bitcoin mining. It has previously been argued that the only side effect of quantum mining would be an increased difficulty. In this work, we argue that a crucial argument in the analysis of Bitcoin security breaks down when quantum A model for Bitcoin’s security and the declining block subsidy Hasu James Prestwich Brandon Curtis Andrew Miller, Arvind Narayanan, Ed Felten, Elaine Ou, Emin Gun Sirer, Eric Budish, Eric Lombrozo, Eric miner first buys non-BTC goods or services using BTC on the original chain. Once he has The reports of Bitcoin's fundamental brokenness have been greatly exaggerated. And academic Ed Felten who has less skin in the game than Andresen says Bitcoin isn't so broken after a review of
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